Dynamic Multisource Multipath Routing for Intrusion Tolerance and Lifetime Maximization of Autonomous Wireless Sensor Networks by Hamid Al-hamadi & Ing-ray Chen
1 
 
Dynamic Multisource Multipath Routing for Intrusion 
Tolerance and Lifetime Maximization of Autonomous 
Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
Hamid Al-Hamadi and Ing-Ray Chen 
Department of Computer Science 
Virginia Tech 
{hhamadi, irchen}@vt.edu 
 
 
Abstract— Multisource multipath data routing to a remote sink 
node is an effective way to cope with unreliable and malicious 
nodes in autonomous wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In this 
paper we analyze the optimal amount of redundancy in terms of 
the number of source sensors sensing the same physical 
phenomena and the number of paths through which data are 
routed to a remote sink node in the presence of unreliable and 
malicious nodes so that the query success probability is 
maximized while maximizing the sensor network lifetime. Our 
dynamic multisource multipath routing algorithm design 
integrates with a voting-based distributed intrusion detection 
algorithm to remove malicious nodes from the sensor network. 
By controlling the redundancy level for multisource multipath 
and intrusion detection settings dynamically with energy 
considerations as prescribed by our algorithm, we demonstrate 
that the lifetime of a query-based autonomous WSN is maximized 
in response to changing environment conditions including node 
density, radio range, and node capture rate. 
Keywords — Wireless sensor networks, multisource multipath 
routing, intrusion detection, security, reliability, timeliness. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Advances in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) lead to its 
wide deployment across many fields. Many WSN applications 
have high quality of service (QoS) requirements in security, 
reliability and timeliness. Also many autonomous WSNs are 
deployed in an unattended manner, so sensor nodes (SNs) are 
susceptible to capture attacks turning them into malicious 
inside attackers. SNs have limited resources in energy, 
computation, transmission range, and storage capability. Thus, 
the challenge is not only in providing designs satisfying the 
application specific QoS requirements but also in a way that 
would consume minimum energy and prolong the lifetime. 
Multipath routing is considered an effective way to 
improve data delivery in WSNs. The basic idea is that the 
probability of at least one path reaching the sink node or base 
station increases as we have more paths doing data delivery. 
While most prior research focused on using multipath routing 
to improve reliability [10, 22], some attention has been paid to 
using multipath routing to tolerate insider attacks [16, 18]. 
Most studies, however, largely ignored the tradeoff between 
QoS gain vs. energy consumption which can adversely shorten 
the system lifetime. The tradeoff issue between energy 
consumption vs. QoS gain becomes much more complicated 
when inside attackers are present as a path may be broken 
when a malicious node is on the path. Moreover very likely 
the system would employ an intrusion detection system (IDS) 
with the goal to detect and remove malicious nodes. While the 
literature is abundant in intrusion detection techniques for 
WSNs [6, 13, 14], the issue of how often intrusion detection 
should be invoked to remove potentially malicious nodes so 
that the system lifetime is maximized is largely unexplored. 
The issue is especially critical for energy-constrained WSNs 
designed to stay alive autonomously for a long time.  
In this paper we address the tradeoff between energy 
consumption vs. gain in reliability and security with the goal 
to maximize the lifetime of a query-based autonomous WSN. 
More specifically, we analyze the optimal amount of 
redundancy in terms of the number of source SNs sensing the 
same physical phenomena and the number of paths through 
which data are routed to a remote sink in the presence of 
malicious nodes so that the query success probability is 
maximized while maximizing the WSN lifetime. Our 
contribution is a model-based analysis methodology by which 
the optimal multisource multipath redundancy levels and 
intrusion detection settings are identified for lifetime 
maximization of query-based WSNs. Untreated in the 
literature, our multisource multipath routing algorithm design 
integrates with a voting-based distributed intrusion detection 
algorithm to remove malicious nodes from the sensor network. 
By controlling the redundancy level for multisource multipath 
and intrusion detection settings dynamically with energy 
considerations as prescribed by our algorithm, we demonstrate 
that the lifetime of a query-based wireless sensor network is 
maximized in response to changing environment conditions 
including node density, radio range, and node capture rate.  
II.  RELATED WORK 
Over the past few years, numerous protocols have been 
proposed to detect intrusion in WSNs [6]. In [14], a 
decentralized rule-based intrusion detection system was 
proposed by which monitor nodes are responsible for 
monitoring neighboring nodes using promiscuous listening 2 
 
and monitoring the collisions for the messages they send to 
their neighbors. Our host IDS essentially follows this strategy, 
with the flaws of the host IDS characterized by a false positive 
probability (Hpfp) and a false negative probability (Hpfn). In 
[14], however, there was no consideration about bad-mouthing 
attacks by compromised monitor nodes themselves, so if a 
monitor node is malicious, it can quickly infect others.  Our 
voting-based IDS approach extends from [13] with 
considerations given to the tradeoff between energy loss vs. 
security and reliability gain due to employment of voting-
based IDS with the goal to prolong the WSN system lifetime. 
In the literature, many multipath routing protocols have 
been proposed for wireless sensor networks. In [18] multiple 
paths are used to route traffic to the destination using 
geographic routing, aiming to increase packet delivery ratio in 
the presence of packet dropping attacks (through blackhole 
and selective forwarding). A trust based approach is taken by 
which a sender uses overhearing to monitor if the next nodes 
forward its packets. Our work differs from theirs in that we 
concern not only multipath routing, but also energy 
consumption issues to maximize the WSN system lifetime in 
the presence of malicious nodes performing bad-mouthing 
attacks and packet dropping attacks. INSENS [16] is a disjoint 
multipath routing protocol that aims to tolerate intrusions by 
using multiple redundant paths to send a message to a 
destination. It aims to operate correctly in the presence of 
undetected intruders. However, it relies on the existence of a 
powerful base station to plan multipath routing, which is 
normally not available in WSNs, or otherwise would be a 
single point of failure. Our approach is totally distributed with 
hop-by-hop formation of multiple paths. SEEM [19] is a 
multipath routing protocol that also relies on a powerful base 
station to perform route discovery, maintenance, and route 
selection. However, it does not consider the existence of 
malicious nodes and there is no consideration given to detect 
attacks. Our approach is totally distributed, with 
considerations given to the presence and detection of 
malicious nodes in the WSN. In [21], packets are sent over 
randomized dispersive multipath routes with the aim to avoid 
black holes resulting from compromised nodes performing 
packet dropping and/or denial of service attacks. A packet is 
split into n shares based on coding theory so that if k out of n 
shares are received then the packet can be reconstructed. The 
randomized multipath routes generated are dispersive to avoid 
the black hole and to enhance the probability of at least k out 
of  n shares can reach the receiver. The approach, however, 
does not consider intrusion detection to detect compromised 
nodes. Our work considers multipath multisource routing as 
well to circumvent black hole attacks for intrusion tolerance. 
In addition, we consider intrusion detection to detect and evict 
compromised nodes as well as the best rate to invoke intrusion 
detection to best tradeoff energy consumption vs. security and 
reliability gain to maximize the system lifetime.   
III.  SYSTEM MODEL 
We consider a WSN with low-power SNs distributed in a 
geographic area through air-drop. SNs are homogenous with 
the same initial energy (Eo). The deployment area of the WSN 
is of size A
2. SNs are distributed according to a homogeneous 
spatial Poisson process with intensity λ. We assume the 
domain is relatively free of obstacles and the WSN is dense 
enough so that the length of a path connecting two SNs can be 
approximated by the straight line distance divided by r.   The 
transmission power is kept to a minimum such that one-hop 
radio range (r) is used for transmission. Thus, any 
communication between two nodes with a distance greater 
than r between them would require a multi-hop. The one-hop 
radio range can be adjusted to maintain connectivity as the 
network becomes less dense because of node failures at the 
expense of more energy consumption.  
Environment conditions which could cause a SN to fail 
with a certain probability include hardware failure (q), and 
transmission failure due to noise and interference (e). 
Moreover, the WSN is vulnerable to sensor captures, i.e., SNs 
may be captured and compromised. Because of random 
deployment of SNs (e.g., air drop), we assume all SNs have 
equal chances of capture with the capture time characterized 
by a distribution function Fc(t) based on historical data and 
knowledge about the application environment. 
The WSN is cluster-based, where CHs are elected 
periodically using an energy-saving clustering algorithm (e.g., 
[17, 23]), and form clusters with non-CH nodes. The 
clustering algorithm ensures that the energy due to the role of 
CH is distributed fairly evenly among nodes by performing a 
fair rotation of the CH role among SNs. Queries can be issued 
by a mobile user (while moving) and can be issued anywhere 
in the WSN through a nearby CH. A CH which takes a query 
to process is called a query processing center (PC).  Each 
query has a strict timeliness requirement (Treq). The query must 
be delivered within Treq seconds; otherwise, the query fails.  
Multisource multipath routing is achieved through two 
forms of redundancy: (a) source redundancy by which ms SNs 
sensing a physical phenomenon in the same feature zone are 
used to forward sensing data to their CH, referred to as a 
source CH; (b) path redundancy by which mp paths are used to 
relay packets from the source CH to the PC. It has been 
reported that the number of edge-disjoint paths between nodes 
is equal to the average node degree with a very high 
probability [15]. Therefore, when the density is sufficiently 
high such that the average number of one-hop neighbors is 
sufficiently larger than mp and ms, we can effectively result in 
mp redundant paths for path redundancy and ms distinct paths 
from ms sensors for source redundancy. 
Geographic forwarding is used to route the information 
between nodes; thus, no path information is maintained. Only 
the location of the destination SN needs to be known to 
correctly forward a packet. As part of clustering, a CH knows 
the locations of SNs within its cluster, and vice versa. We 
assume that SNs operate in power saving mode (e.g. [7, 20]). 
Thus, a SN is either active (transmitting or receiving) or in 
sleep mode. For the transmission and reception energy 
consumption of sensors, we adopt the energy model in [23]. 
We assume that the WSN executes a pairwise key 
establishment protocol in a secure interval after deployment. 3 
 
Each node establishes pairwise keys with its k-hop neighbors, 
where k is large enough to cover a cluster area. Thus, upon 
electing a new CH, the CH will have pairwise keys with the 
SNs joining its cluster. Since every SN shares a pairwise key 
with its CH, a SN can encrypt data sent to the CH for 
confidentiality and authentication purposes. Due to limited 
resources, we assume that when a node is compromised, it 
only performs two most energy conserving attacks, namely, 
bad-mouthing attacks (recommending a good node as a bad 
node and a bad node as a good node) when serving as a 
recommender, and packet dropping attacks when performing 
packet routing to disrupt the operation of the network.   
To detect and remove malicious nodes from the system, a 
voting-based distributed IDS is applied periodically in every 
     time interval. How often should      be is a design issue 
which we aim to identify in this paper. Every node runs a 
simple  host IDS using overhearing and promiscuous 
monitoring techniques (e.g., [5, 14]) to assess its neighbors. 
The flaws of the host IDS is characterized by a false positive 
probability (Hpfp) and a false negative probability (Hpfn), which 
are assumed known at deployment time. In each interval, m 
neighbor nodes around a target node will be chosen randomly 
as voters to decide if the target node is still a good node. The 
m voters share their votes through secure transmission using 
their pairwise keys. How big should m be is another design 
issue which we aim to identify in this paper. When the 
majority of voters come to the conclusion that a target node is 
bad, then the target node is evicted. There is a system-level 
false positive probability (    ) that the voters can incorrectly 
identify a good node as a bad node. There is also a system-
level false negative probability (      ) that the voters can 
incorrectly misidentify a bad node as a good node. These two 
system-level IDS probabilities will be derived based on the 
bad-mouthing attack model in the paper. To provide a unifying 
metric that considers the above two design tradeoffs, we 
define the total number of queries the system can answer 
correctly until it fails as the lifetime or the mean time to failure 
(MTTF) of the system which can be translated into the actual 
system lifetime span based on the query arrival rate. 
IV.  PROBABILITY MODEL 
In this section we develop a probability model to estimate 
the MTTF of an autonomous WSN using multisource 
multipath data forwarding to answer queries issued from a 
mobile user roaming in the WSN area. The basic idea of our 
MTTF formulation is that we first deduce the maximum 
number of queries, Nq, the system can possible handle before 
running into energy exhaustion for the best case in which all 
queries are processed successfully. Because the system 
evolves dynamically, the amount of energy spent per query 
also varies dynamically. Given the query arrival rate  q  as 
input, we can reasonably estimate the amount of energy spent 
due to query processing and intrusion detection for query j 
based on the query arrival time    , . Next we derive the 
corresponding query success probability      ,  , that is, the 
probability that the response to query j arriving at time   ,  is 
delivered successfully before the query deadline expires. 
Finally, we compute MTTF as the probability-weighted 
average of the number of queries the system can handle 
without experiencing any deadline, transmission, or security 
failure. More specifically, the MTTF is given by: 
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Here   ∏      ,    
      1       ,       accounts for the 
probability of the system being able to successfully execute i 
consecutive queries but failing the i+1
th  query. The second 
term is for the best case in which all queries are processed 
successfully without experiencing any failure for which the 
system will have the longest lifetime span. 
A.  Network Dynamics 
Initially at deployment all SNs are good nodes. Assume that 
the capture time of a SN follows a distribution function Fc(t) 
which can be determined based on historical data and 
knowledge about the target application environment. Then, the 
probability that a SN is compromised at time t, given that it 
was a good node at time t-    , denoted by    , is given by:  
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We note that     is time dependent. For the special case in 
which the capture time is exponential distributed with rate λc,  
     1           . Recall that the voting-based distributed 
IDS executes periodically with      being the interval. At the 
i
th IDS execution time (denoted by   , ), a good node may have 
been compromised with probability      since the previous IDS 
execution time    ,    . Let         and         denote  the 
numbers of good and bad neighbor nodes at time t, 
respectively, with                          .  Then,  the 
population of good and bad neighbor nodes at time   ,  just 
prior to IDS execution can be recursively estimated from the 
population of good and bad neighbor nodes at time   ,    : 
        ,            ,               ,         
(3) 
       ,           ,               ,         
With          and         in hand, the system-level false 
positive probability (    ) and false negative probability (    ) as 
a resulting of executing voting-based IDS are as follows: 
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where        is the minimum majority of m, e.g., 3 is the 
minimum majority of 5, and ⍵ is      for calculating      and 
     for calculating     . We explain Equation 4 for the false 
positive probability at time t below. The explanation to the 
false negative probability is similar. A false positive results 
when the majority of the voters vote against the target node 4 
 
(which is a good node) as compromised. The first term in 
Equation 4 accounts for the case in which more than 1/2 of the 
voters selected from the target node’s neighbors are bad 
sensors who, as a result of performing bad-mouthing attacks, 
will always vote a good node as a bad node to break the 
functionality of the WSN. Here the denominator is the total 
number of combinations to select m voters out of all neighbor 
nodes, and the numerator is the total number of combinations 
to select at least mmaj bad voters out of nbad nodes and the 
remaining good voters out of ngood nodes. The second term 
accounts for the case in which more than 1/2 of the voters 
selected from the neighbors are good nodes but unfortunately 
some of these good nodes mistakenly misidentify the target 
nodes as a bad node with probability Hpfp, resulting in more 
than 1/2 of the voters (some of those may be bad nodes) voting 
against the target node. Here the denominator is again the total 
number of combinations to select m voters out of  all neighbor 
nodes, and the numerator is the total number of combinations 
to select i bad voters not exceeding the majority mmaj, j good 
voters who diagnose incorrectly with i + j  ≥ mmaj, and the 
remaining m – i – j good voters who diagnose correctly. 
After the voting-based IDS is executed, some good nodes 
will be misidentified as bad nodes with probability      and will 
be mistakenly removed from the WSN. Consequently, we need 
to adjust the population of good nodes after IDS execution. Let  
                     be the number of good neighbor nodes at time t right 
after IDS execution. Then, 
        ,                           ,            ,         (5) 
On the other hand, some bad nodes will remain in the 
system because the voting-based IDS fails to identify them 
with probability      . Let                      be the number of bad 
neighbor nodes at time t right after IDS execution. Then, 
       ,                         ,           ,     1        (6) 
As the capture attack is totally random, the probability that 
any neighbor node is a bad node at time t, denoted by   ,    , 
thus is given by: 
  ,    ,   
       ,               
       ,                          ,                  (7) 
  ,     derived above provides critical information as a bad 
node can perform packet dropping attacks if it is on a path 
from source SNs to the PC. Here we note that the node 
population density is evolving because of some nodes being 
compromised and some being detected and evicted by the IDS 
dynamically. The node population remains the same until the 
next IDS execution (after      seconds) because the IDS only 
detects and evicts nodes periodically (as typically node 
hardware/software failure happens less frequently than 
security failure). Denote the node population density at time t 
by      with   0 =  . Then,      can be computed by: 
    ,            ,                          ,                  (8) 
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    ,  
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B.  Query Success Probability 
There are three ways by which data forwarding from SNj 
to SNk could fail: (a) transmission speed violation; (b) 
sensor/channel failures; and (c) SNj is compromised. 
The first source of failure, transmission speed violation, 
accounts for query deadline violation. To know the failure 
probability due to transmission speed violation, we first derive 
the minimum hop-by-hop transmission speed required to 
satisfy the query deadline     . Let  dSN-CH  be the expected 
distance between a SN (selected to report sensor readings) and 
its CH and dCH-PC be the expected distance between the source 
CH and the PC accepting the query result. Given a query 
deadline      as input, a data packet from a SN through its CH 
to the PC must reach the PC within     . Thus, the minimum 
hop-by-hop transmission speed denoted by      is given by: 
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PC CH CH SN
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(10) 
Since a SN becomes a CH with probability p and all the 
sensors are distributed in the area in accordance with a spatial 
Poisson process with intensity λ, CHs and non-CH SNs will 
also be distributed in accordance with a spatial Poisson 
process with rates pλ and (1-p)λ respectively. Non-CH SNs 
thus would join the closest CH to form a Voronoi cell [1] 
corresponding to a cluster in the WSN. It can be shown that 
the average number of non-CH SNs in each Voronoi cell is (1-
p)/p and the expected distance from a SN to its CH is given by 
        1 / 2          / . On the other hand, since a query may 
be issued from anywhere by the mobile user to a CH (which 
serves as the PC) and the source CH requested by the query 
also can be anywhere in the WSN, dCH-PC essentially is the 
average distance between any two CHs in the WSN. Given 
location randomness of CHs in the square area A
2, it can be 
shown geometrically that the average distance between any 
two CHs is dCH-PC =0.382A. With the knowledge of dSN-CH and 
dCH-PC, we can also estimate the average numbers of hops to 
forward data from a SN to the source CH, denoted by    
  , and 
the average numbers of hops to forward data from the source 
CH to the PC, denoted by     
  , by    
          /  and 
   
          /  where r is radio range. 
Let   ,   denote the probability that the forwarding speed 
from SNj to SNk would violate the minimum speed 
requirement, thus leading to a query deadline violation failure. 
To calculate Qt,jk we need to know the transmission speed Sjk 
from SNj to SNk. This can be dynamically measured by SNj. If 
Sjk is above Sreq then Qt,jk = 0; otherwise, Qt,jk = 1. In general Sjk 
is not known until runtime. If Sjk is uniformly distributed 
within a range [a, b], then Qt,jk can be computed as: 
a b
a S
S S cdf Q
req
req jk jk t −
−
= ≤ = ) ( ,
  (11) 
The second source of failure is due to sensor failure or 
channel failure. Let   ,  denote the probability of failure due 
to sensor failure or channel failure. Since q is the hardware 
failure probability and ej is transmission failure probability of 
node j, given as input,   ,  can be estimated by: 
)] 1 )( 1 [( 1 , j j r e q Q − − − =   (12) 
The third source of failure is due to node j being 
compromised and thus the packet is dropped. We make use of 
  ,     derived earlier in Equation 7. By combining these three 5 
 
failure probabilities we obtain     ,  , the probability of SNj 
failing to relay a data packet to a one-hop neighbor SNk 
because of either speed violation, sensor/channel failure, or 
SNj being compromised, as: 
)] 1 )( 1 )( 1 [( 1 , , , , j c jk t j r jk rtc Q Q Q Q − − − − =   (13) 
By using this one-hop failure probability, we next compute 
the success probability for SNj to transmit a packet to at least 
one next-hop SN neighbor along the direction of the 
destination node as: 
∏
×
=
− =
n f
k
jk rtc j Q
1
, 1 θ
 
(14)   
where f =1/4 to account for the fact that only neighbor SNs in 
the quadrant toward the destination node can perform 
geographic forwarding; n is the number of neighbor SNs of 
node j as given in Equation 8.  
     Since on average there will be     
  hops on a path from 
the source CH to the PC, a data packet transmitted along the 
path is successfully delivered only if it is delivered successful 
hop-by-hop without experiencing any speed violation failure, 
hardware/channel failure, or packet dropping failure, for 
   
    hops. Consequently, the probability of a single path 
between the source CH and the PC being able to deliver data 
successfully is given by: 
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(15)   
For path redundancy, we create mp  paths between the 
source CH and the PC. The mp paths are formed by choosing 
mp SNs in the first hop and then choosing only one SN in each 
of the subsequent hops. The source CH will fail to deliver data 
to the PC if one of the following happens: (a) none of the SNs 
in the first hop receives the message; (b) in the first hop, i (1≤ 
i<mp) SNs receive the message, and each of them attempts to 
form a path for data delivery; however, all i paths fail to 
deliver the message because the subsequent hops fail to 
receive the broadcast message; (c) in the first hop, at least mp 
SNs receive the message from the source CH from which mp 
SNs are randomly selected to forward data, but all mp paths 
fail to deliver the message because the subsequent hops fail to 
receive the message.  Summarizing above, the probability of 
the source CH failing to deliver data to the PC is given by: 
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(16) 
Following the same derivation to Equation 15, the success 
probability of a single path from a SN to its CH is given by: 
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For source redundancy we use ms  SNs to report query 
responses to their source CH. The probability that all ms SNs 
fail to deliver data to their CH is given by: 
)] ( 1 [
1
h
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Consequently, the failure probability of data delivery from 
ms SNs to the CH, and subsequently using mp paths to relay 
data from CH to PC, is given by:  
) 1 )( 1 ( 1
s p m
fs
m
fp f Q Q Q − − − = (19)
Therefore, the query success probability is given by: 
f q Q R − =1
  (20)
Note that in the above derivation we omit time for brevity. 
More precisely,    derived above should be      ,   since the 
query success probability is a function of time, depending on 
the node count (Equation 8) and population density (Equation 
9) at the i
th query’s execution time (i.e., at time   , ). 
C.  Energy Consumption 
Due to space limit, we sketch the procedure for computing 
Nq, the maximum number of queries the system can possible 
handle before running into energy exhaustion, required by 
Equation 1. The basic idea is to estimate the amount of energy 
consumed for query processing, intrusion detection, and 
clustering, respectively, based on an energy model [23]. Then, 
we can estimate Nq by the fact that the total energy consumed 
due to intrusion detection, clustering and query processing is 
equal to the system energy.  
V.  PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, we present numerical results obtained from 
the evaluation of our probability model given in Section IV. 
Without loss of generality, we consider an example WSN 
consisting of 1500 nodes deployed in a square area of A
2 
(400m×400m). Nodes are distributed in the area following a 
Poisson process with density λ =15 nodes/(40×40 m
2) at 
deployment time. The radio range r is 40m. So initially a SN 
has n=λ  ×  πr
2=15 neighbor SNs. The probability of a SN 
becoming a CH is p=1%. So initially a cluster has 1/p=100 
nodes and there are 15 clusters in the system. Each SN has an 
initial energy level Eo = 10 Joules. The energy parameters used 
by the radio module are adopted from [17, 23] . The energy 
dissipation Eelec to run the transmitter and receiver circuitry is 
50 nJ/bit. The energy used by the transmit amplifier to achieve 
an acceptable signal to noise ratio (εamp) is 10 pJ/bit/m
2. The 
query arrival rate λq is a variable and is set to 1 query/sec to 
reveal points of interest. The query deadline Treq is strict and 
set to between 0.3 and 1 sec. The inter-arrival time in between 
captures (     ) is between 4 and 28 days, corresponding to a 
capture rate (λc) of once per 4 days to once per 28 days. The 
host IDS false positive probability and false negative 
probability (Hpfp and Hpfn) vary between 1% and 5% to reflect 6 
 
the host intrusion detection strength as in [14]. Our objective 
is to identify the best setting in terms of mp (path redundancy), 
ms (source redundancy), m (the number of voters for intrusion 
detection) and       (the intrusion detection interval) to 
maximize MTTF. 
In Fig. 1, we show MTTF vs. (mp, ms) for three cases: (a) 
there are no malicious nodes and no intrusion detection (the 
top curve); (b) there are malicious nodes but there is no 
intrusion detection (the bottom curve); (c) there are malicious 
nodes and there is intrusion detection (the middle two curves). 
In each case we observe the existence of an optimal (mp, ms) 
value under which MTTF is maximized. When there are no 
malicious nodes (the top curve), the optimal (mp, ms) is (3,3). 
When there are malicious nodes, and no intrusion detection is 
used, the optimal (mp, ms) value becomes (7,7) because using 
higher redundancy in multisource multipath routing is 
necessary to cope with malicious nodes. When intrusion 
detection is used (middle curves), there exists an optimal m 
value to maximize MTTF. In Fig. 1, m=5 yields a higher 
MTTF value than m=3 because in this scenario the attack rate 
is relatively high (once a week), so a higher number of voters 
is needed to cope with and detect bad nodes more effectively. 
We observe that the maximum MTTF is sensitive to       and 
m. Table 1 below summarizes the effect of       and m on 
optimal (mp, ms) values under which MTTF is maximized. As 
the number of voters in intrusion detection (m) increases, the 
optimal (mp, ms) redundancy level decreases. This is because 
increasing m has the effect of detecting and evicting bad nodes 
more effectively, thus requiring a lower level of redundancy in 
(mp, ms) to cope with packet dropping attacks by bad nodes. 
On the other hand, when given a       there exists an 
optimal  m value that will maximize MTTF. Table 2 
summarizes the effect of       on the optimal m value at 
which MTTF is maximized.  When the node capture rate 
increases from once per 3 weeks (      = 3 weeks) to once a 
week (      = 1 week), the optimal m value goes from 3 to 7. 
The reason is that as the capture rate increases, there are more 
and more malicious nodes in the system, so using more voters 
(e.g. m =7) can help identify and evict malicious nodes, thus 
increasing the query success probability and consequently 
increasing the MTTF value. Again the system is better off this 
way to cope with increasing malicious node population for 
lifetime maximization even though more energy is consumed 
due to more voters being used. 
Lastly          is also a tunable parameter to maximize 
MTTF. Fig. 2 shows MTTF vs.      with varying       values. 
It exhibits the trend that as the capture rate increases (a smaller 
      value), the optimal      at which MTTF is maximized 
must decrease to cope with malicious attacks. Furthermore, the 
optimal       value increases as m increases. The reason is that 
as the number of voters (m) increases so the intrusion 
detection capability increases per invocation, there is no need 
to invoke intrusion detection too often so as not to waste 
energy and adversely shorten the system lifetime. Table 3 
summarizes the effect of       and  m on the optimal       
value at which MTTF is maximized. 
 
Figure 1. MTTF vs. (mp, ms): (3, 4) and (4, 4) are Optimal When m=5 and 3, 
Respectively. 
 
TABLE 1. OPTIMAL (  ,   ) WITH VARYING       AND  . 
 
TABLE 2. OPTIMAL   WITH VARYING       AND     . 
 
TABLE 3. OPTIMAL      WITH VARYING       AND  . 
 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 presented above are numerical solutions 
generated from evaluating the analytical equations derived in 
Section IV, given node density λ, radio range r, and node 
capture rate λc as input. As the system evolves, all these input 
parameter values may change, that is, λ will decrease as 
described by Equation 9, radio range r will increase to 
maintain connectivity as more nodes fail or are evicted from 
the system, and λc may evolve depending on the instantaneous 
attacker strength. Lookup tables such as Tables 1, 2 and 3 are 
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built at static time, covering a wide range of (λ, r, λc) values as 
input. Our dynamic multisource multipath routing algorithm 
then utilizes these lookup tables built at static time to perform 
a simple lookup operation to decide the optimal settings of 
(mp, ms, m,       to maximize MTTF at runtime.  
 
 
Figure 2. Effect of Capture Rate on MTTF. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we provided a solution to the issue of dynamic 
and adaptive multisource multipath routing for intrusion 
tolerance and lifetime maximization in autonomous wireless 
sensor networks. We developed a novel probability model to 
analyze the best multisource multipath redundancy level in 
terms of path redundancy (mp) and source redundancy (ms), as 
well as the best intrusion detection settings in terms of the 
number of voters (m) and the intrusion invocation interval ( 
    ) under which the lifetime of a query-based wireless sensor 
network may be maximized in the presence of unreliable 
wireless communication and malicious nodes. Our dynamic 
multisource multipath routing algorithm utilizes the analysis 
result to determine the optimal system settings for redundancy 
and intrusion detection based on the sensed environmental 
conditions at runtime, thus resulting in the system achieving its 
maximum lifetime.  
In the future we plan to consider more sophisticated 
attacker models, e.g., a smart adversary that can perform more 
targeted attacks, capture certain strategic nodes with higher 
probability, alternate between benign and malicious behavior 
and collude with other attackers to avoid intrusion detection. 
This paper addresses the best redundancy level for multisource 
multipath routing, i.e., how many sources and how many paths 
one should use for multisource multipath routing to maximize 
the system lifetime. In the future, we plan to explore trust 
management [2, 3, 8] for performing intrusion detection 
augmented with fuzzy failure criteria [4] to address the issue of 
what paths one should use to avoid untrustworthy, malicious 
nodes to further enhance WSN survivability. This may involve 
the use of trust-based admission control strategies [9, 11, 12] to 
increase the probability of path success probability for data 
delivery. 
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